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The engineering and design of complex systems often requires that multiple 
design tasks be executed in parallel or overlapping efforts.  When the design of individual 
subsystems is distributed among multiple organizations, challenges arise with respect to 
managing design productivity and coordinating successful collaborative exchanges.  
Research and development engineering projects compound these challenges further due 
to their inherently greater uncertainty.  This report examines several factors that influence 
design productivity in the collaborative research and development environment, including 
the selection of subsystem interfaces, design information management, and complexity 
management.  A collaborative research and development project to upgrade the Hobby-
Eberly Telescope is introduced to provide case examples and illustrate the proposed value 
of subsequent management recommendations.  
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1.1.   INTRODUCTION 
Collaborative, concurrent, simultaneous, or parallel engineering...regardless of the 
specific nomenclature used, collaborative engineering is becoming increasingly more 
prevalent and important to engineering projects that include a research and development 
component.  For any technical manager involved with the design of products or 
processes, directing a collaborative design effort will pose difficult challenges.  It is vital 
for design managers to have a sound grasp on several issues specific to the collaborative 
environment, as societal trends will only continue to increase the scope and necessity of 
inter and intra-organization collaboration in fields that require routine technological 
advancement.  Such trends include the need for professional and technical specialists in 
high-tech sectors, industrial globalization, time-to-market economics, and modular and 
system-based product architectures [15], [17].  A final trend worth individual attention is 
the widespread sharing of digital information and the rapid development of internet 
communication tools and software.  The ability to transmit file data, audio, and video 
communication in near real-time via high-speed internet connection has enabled design 
collaboration to span cities, nations, and continents.  Aerospace, consumer electronics, 
and automobile manufacturers are just a few examples of participants in truly global 
engineering collaborations. 
This report focuses on strategies for understanding and managing design effort 
productivity in increasingly complex collaborative environments which are accompanied 
by equally complex engineering objectives.  Case examples from the Hobby-Eberly 
Telescope “Dark Energy eXperiment” project will be introduced to illustrate several 
facets of a recent collaborative design project involving significant engineering research 
and development. 
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1.2.   BACKGROUND 
The Hobby Eberly Telescope (HET) is the third largest operational ground-based 
telescope in the world at the time of this writing [8], (Figure 1).  Commissioned and 
managed by a consortium of five universities, the HET resides at the University of Texas 
McDonald Observatory near Ft. Davis, Texas.  The “Wide Field Upgrade” to the Hobby 
Eberly Telescope, which will enable the Dark Energy eXperiment (together referred to as 
HETDEX), is a an estimated $33 million upgrade to the HET’s optics, instrumentation, 
electromechanical positioning system, and electronic controls for the purpose of 
upgrading its capabilities to enable precise measurements that will contribute to scientific 
understanding of dark energy1
 
 [2].  Within the present context of this report, the project 
has reached mid-term between its engineering kick-off and scheduled commissioning 
date. 
Figure 1:  The Hobby Eberly Telescope (CAD model created by HETDEX team). 
                                                 
1 “Dark energy” refers to the phenomenon thought to be behind the Universe’s increasing rate of 
expansion, which has been measured but not yet fully explained by the scientific research community.  
HETDEX will perform measurements of the expansion history of the Universe, which may contribute to a 
more complete scientific theory of dark energy [10]. 
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There are some aspects of the HETDEX upgrade project that will not directly 
compare to industrial R&D projects.  The greatest of which being that it is a one-time 
engineering effort which will not be repeated by the same group of designers in 
subsequent projects, nor are there considerations for sales or production in quantity 
beyond first-prototype hardware.  As a result, there are also fewer engineering 
compromises between performance and cost, and other similar tradeoffs often 
encountered in the realm of industrial or commercial product development. 
Barring these differences, the design phase itself has many characteristics that 
share familiarity across R&D projects, irrespective of discipline or industry.  The scope 
of the HETDEX upgrade requires engineering expertise from several disciplines, and 
from groups that are dispersed among separate organizations and, in some cases, spread 
geographically around the globe.  There were many design requirements and constraints 
either still evolving or yet to be determined at the onset of the project (some of which 
could not be determined prior to initial concept development).  Time-to-market pressure 
has also been present in the form of completing the dark energy experiment in time to 
maximize scientific relevance, and to contribute the project’s engineering achievements 
to benefit similar projects within the scientific community.  Finally, despite the one-time 
nature of the project, significant design consideration has been granted to reliability, 
maintainability, and manufacturability of the various components. 
To satisfy all design objectives within the environment described above, it can be 
inferred that a substantial degree of collaboration is required among design participants.  
Accounts of noteworthy interactions pertaining to the parallel efforts of the parties 
involved will be given in subsequent sections of this report.   
1.3.   THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING COLLABORATIVE DESIGN 
Developing and engineering a system as complex as the one required for the 
HETDEX upgrade, and within a span of less than four years from start through 
production, testing, installation, and commissioning, is only one factor driving the need 
for parallel design efforts.  Tightly integrated subsystem functions and interfaces have 
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made parallel and collaborative design a necessity due to the “chicken and egg” problems 
of large-scale system design.  There are many instances where one subsystem cannot be 
designed without requisite knowledge of the other, nor can one design be substantially 
altered without reflexively impacting another.  
Both the goal of design managers, and the obstacle to reaching this goal posed by 
the parallel collaborative environment, can be stated in very fundamental terms.  Goal: 
Maintain a high level of design productivity by enabling high-quality designs and 
limiting unnecessary design iteration.  Obstacle: Design decisions must be made with less 
than optimal quantity and quality of information.  Even though the problem statement 
appears fundamental, there exists no single easy solution, set of tools, or list of rules that 
can address its full implications.  Some say that the application of “best practices” is the 
most that can be hoped for in lieu of a guaranteed design process [1], while others 
contend that there are no best practices and instead an overarching “way of thinking” is 
required [16].  The resounding theme, though, is that design management must be as 
dynamic, adaptable, and change-tolerant as the component designs themselves to make 
collaboration a success.  Within the collaborative environment, a compromise must be 
made between attempting to resolve uncertainty and accepting that collaborative design 
will be an organic and uncertain process.  Design management may then consist of 
making clear and decisive choices without an overly-inhibited conscience, achieved by 
collecting the best information available regarding the range of potential consequences 
and processing that information effectively.  The purpose of this report is not to introduce 
new dogma for best practices or holistic ways of thinking.  Instead it will concentrate on 
illuminating a few key factors that have far-reaching impacts on the collaborative design 
project outcome, followed by recommendations to assist their monitor and control.  These 
factors include the choices made when dividing a system into its subsystems to form the 
product architecture, the exchange of design information, and problems that arise from 
growing complexity.  
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2. The Implications of System Architecture 
 
“Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well 
informed just to be undecided about them.” - Laurence J. Peter (from [3]) 
The above quote illustrates the fundamental problem encountered when the output 
of a design effort will be a system that possesses higher-order complexity as a byproduct.  
The problem is compounded even further when collaboration is involved, because the 
“well informed” component becomes that much more difficult to achieve due to 
additional constraints on communication.  System architecture choices may not be 
immediately associated with communication needs and constraints, but it will be shown 
that architecture is a deterministic factor. 
System architecture refers to the structural arrangement of the system being 
designed and, more specifically, to the division of the system into subsystems and the 
resulting connectivity and interactions between subsystems [12], [16].  Dividing a system 
into functional blocks, subsystems, and even further into modules is what permits parallel 
engineering to occur, such that the work can be divided amongst various groups who will 
collaborate to shepherd the modules through the design process simultaneously.  The 
division of work responsibility, however, is not necessarily the underlying motivator for 
collaboration.   Collaboration is required by the fact that each of the subsystems and 
components that form the product architecture must share compatibility at their interfaces 
for the system to fulfill its intended function.  This section of the report will illustrate 
how system architecture contributes directly to technical and social complexity, and 
therefore management complexity in the end. 
2.1.   SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND COMPLEXITY 
Each division of the system or product creates at least one interface between 
system components.  In order for the system to work, the components must share at least 
one type of compatibility with respect to their intended interaction; often in the form of 
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mechanical interfaces, electrical interconnects, communication protocol, or data format, 
to give some examples.  The creation of interfaces has the effect of creating locations of 
concentrated information within the system [18].  
Consider a video adapter card that plugs into the motherboard of a Personal 
Computer (PC).  The video card design has only a few external constraints with respect to 
the precise dimensions of the circuit board, chip arrangement, chip type to be used, 
internal electrical connections, etc.  This leaves the video card’s designer a substantial 
amount of latitude to make decisions without affecting other aspects of the computer’s 
design.  However, at the interface between the video card and motherboard, there must be 
strict adherence to pre-established parameters such as the geometric dimensions and 
tolerances of the connector, electrical pin-out arrangement, power and voltage supply 
requirements, communication protocol, and so on.  The designers of the motherboard and 
video card must each have detailed knowledge of this interface.  Furthermore, they must 
be able to clearly communicate the relevant interface design information to one another, 
notify each other of proposed changes, reach consensus approval, and transmit design 
feedback once the changes have been made.  In this two-part system, the exchange 
between designers is relatively straightforward and manageable. 
Now consider what would happen in a situation where the motherboard designer 
discovers that a non-standard design layout will have to be used, such as mounting the 
video card vertically rather than the usual practice of mounting it horizontally within the 
PC case.  This creates additional, perhaps even unintended interfaces (i.e. interferences) 
for the video card designer, which in turn requires him or her to have more knowledge of 
the overall system and to potentially place additional constraints on the design.  Now the 
video card designer may need to know the location and dimensions of the computer’s 
memory circuit boards (RAM) to check for interferences, and the length of the wire leads 
coming from the power supply to ensure they will still reach the video card.  After 
exchanging emails and telephone calls with the other PC design team members 
responsible for the motherboard layout, RAM, and power supply designs, the responses 
may come back: “The RAM layout hasn’t been finalized yet, and how long do the power 
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leads to the video card actually need to be?”  In reality, if this were also a new and 
untested component configuration, the involvement of the entire PC team in evaluating 
this single design change might be even greater in scope.  They may have to assess issues 
pertaining the enclosure design and impact on thermal performance, which could lead to 
even further design iterations to circuit board layouts and hardware configurations. 
The preceding example was constructed to highlight the technical and social 
complexities that arise in collaborative system design.  In the technical domain, changing 
one interface within a sufficiently complex system had the effect of altering or creating 
new interfaces, and also created the need for additional component design information 
and system level knowledge from all designers involved.  Within the social domain, the 
designers also had to become aware of who possessed the relevant information and 
initiate communications in order to access it.  The following excerpt provides a formal 
conclusion to these observations: 
 
The value of a system lies in its interfaces, not in the individual components. 
These interfaces also determine the complexity of the system, because the number 
of interfaces and interactions between elements grows exponentially with the 
number of components in the system (Reinertsen, [16]). 
 
The second implication from the PC example is the effect that design uncertainty 
has on the design team.  Without being certain where the RAM will reside on the 
motherboard, it is also uncertain where the final placement of the video card will be, and 
therefore the video card designer does not have enough information to accurately specify 
how long the power leads should be.  This leaves two options:  Specify enough length to 
accommodate all locations that are currently being considered, or choose an arbitrary 
length and revise the specification once the exact location is known.  The designer must 
make the decision with less than complete information, and each option will introduce 
some degree of iteration into the design process and communications between team 
members.  This leads to the next conclusion:  “The variability of the system will approach 
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the variability of its most variable component” (Reinertsen, [16]).  In the context of the 
example, the least certain design aspect introduces an equal amount of uncertainty into at 
least one other subsystem design variable when it transcends an interface. 
In the PC design example, a scenario was presented where a change to one 
component of the system precipitated a change to another component, which precipitated 
a change to another, and so on.  This type of “change propagation” is not an unfamiliar 
concept in the realm of engineering design, and it occurs when component changes 
manifest at an interface [1].  Less often considered is how component change propagation 
ripples outward from the designer in terms of their information needs, decision making, 
and team interaction.  This can be viewed as change propagation across the “human 
interface” that exists in collaborative projects.  Interactions between designers represent 
the second-order system in the collaborative design process.  Both the technical and the 
social systems involved can be thought of as dynamic, since disturbances to each will 
energize some form of system response.  Technical and social complexity are each a 
product of the number of interfaces in the system architecture and in the collaborative 
organization.  Increasing complexity will have the effect of making each system’s 
response less clear and predictable before it is set into motion. 
2.2.   HETDEX SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE EXAMPLE 
The single-most involved engineering effort within the HETDEX upgrade is the 
replacement of the Hobby Eberly Telescope’s “Tracker” system (Figure 2).  The Tracker 
is an electromechanical system that positions the telescope’s secondary optics2
                                                 
2 The HET design utilizes a single, large (9.8 meters wide) reflecting mirror called the ‘primary mirror’ to 
gather distant starlight.  ‘Secondary optics’ refers to a second set of smaller focusing mirrors (called the 
Wide Field Corrector) located on the Tracker and above the primary mirror, which focus the reflected light 
so that it can be analyzed with scientific instrumentation [2], [10].  
 with 
micron-level precision, so that incoming light can be received by the telescope’s many 
scientific instruments.  The Tracker receives its name from its primary function of 
dynamically tracking along a moving trajectory such that it follows astronomical objects 
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as they move across the night sky.  To achieve such extreme dynamic accuracy requires 
nearly a dozen actuators, each with sophisticated sensors and electronic controls. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Hobby-Eberly Telescope’s Tracker system (yellow) and Prime Focus 
Instrument Platform (red) (CAD content created by HETDEX team). 
 
The Tracker upgrade is necessitated by two primary needs of the HETDEX 
experiment.  The first is the replacement of the HET’s secondary optics with a new set, 
housed in an assembly called the Wide Field Corrector (WFC), which will create a wider 
field of view on the sky [2], [10].  The new WFC, and the instruments that it will feed 
with starlight, weigh substantially more than the previous Tracker could accommodate.  
The second HETDEX need is a scientific requirement for the astronomical observation of 
dark energy, which demands that the telescope perform a greater number of observations 
each night [2], [10].  Therefore, the Tracker must be able to move back into position 
following an observation in order to “reset” its viewing orientation on the sky much more 
quickly.  To summarize, the upgraded Tracker will be able to carry roughly twice the 
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payload mass and move more than twice as quickly as the previous Tracker, while also 
improving positioning accuracy and observing performance.  
The Tracker is divided into several electronic and mechanical or opto-mechanical 
subsystems, some of which are stand-alone and several of which overlap in terms of their 
function or integration.  The design of each subsystem and its individual components is 
the responsibility of an organization or individual within an organization (Figure 3).  The 
McDonald Observatory (MDO) team, under the astronomy department of the College of 
Natural Sciences at the University of Texas at Austin, is the organization leading the 
project.  MDO also retains responsibility for the design of several instrumentation 
components, telescope controls, site modifications, and components within the Prime 
Focus Instrument Platform3 (PFIP).  They have contracted the Center for 
Electromechanics (CEM) at the University of Texas at Austin to undertake the design and 
manufacture of the new Tracker system, and the University of Arizona to perform the 
same for the Wide Field Corrector.  Further subdivision among organizations occurs 
within the Tracker at the “hexapod,”4
                                                 
3 Prime Focus Instrument Platform (PFIP) refers to the subassembly consisting of of the Wide Field 
Corrector (which includes the secondary optics), the set of tertiary optics, and the set of sub-structures 
which join them. 
4 A hexapod is a movable platform supported by six extendable actuator struts arranged in a truss 
configuration. 
 which is subcontracted to ADS International of 
Lecco, Italy.  Other collaborations within the project include, but are not limited to: 
Texas A&M University, Astrophysikalisches Institut Potsdam of Germany, and members 




Figure 3: Division of major subsystems and interfaces onboard the Tracker by 
organization for the HETDEX upgrade (CAD content created by HETDEX 
team). 
 
Figure 4 provides a schematic representation of the interfaces contained within 
the Tracker.  The partitioning of the upgraded Tracker system is a product of several 
design influences.  This new version of the Tracker will effectively be the “third-
generation” of the Tracker device [2].  The first was designed and constructed for the 
HET as it entered service in the late 1990’s.  The second was produced for SALT, a 
cousin of the HET which shares its functional design, but incorporates many component 
design improvements enabled by the experience gained operating HET throughout the 




Figure 4: Schematic diagram of the HET’s major subsystem interfaces (from [9]). 
 
Many of the Tracker’s critical interfaces became well-defined over the course of 
engineering and designing the two predecessors.  For example, the functional interfaces 
between the Tracker’s main structural member (the Tracker Bridge) and its positioning 
servo-drives are common between all three examples.  Other interfaces reflect the 
substantial differences in specific domain knowledge required to engineer the 
components of certain subsystems.  The interface between the Wide Field Corrector and 
the support structure linking it to the Tracker is one example (refer to Figure 3).  CEM 
specializes in the electromechanical actuation and control engineering required for the 
design of the Tracker, which positions the Wide Field Corrector.   The WFC is contracted 
to the University of Arizona for their expertise designing and manufacturing large optical 
assemblies for ground and space-borne telescopes.  In the instances where major 
interfaces were known beforehand, and for those interfaces that link subsystems under 
the charge of organizationally or geographically separated groups (therefore requiring 
extensive collaboration), an Interface Control Document (ICD) was created or identified 
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in the earliest stages of the project.  Table 1 lists the major ICD’s, and exemplifies the 
variety of mechanical, electrical, thermal, pneumatic, and data interfaces that are typical 
of highly automated systems. 
Table 1: List of current Tracker Interface Control Documents (from [9]).  Each 
document, which is subject to engineering revision controls, contains a full 
description of the interface and lists the associated drawings and 
specifications. 
Document # Interface Described 
HX0039-01-01 Upper Hexagon of Telescope Structure to Tracker Bridge 
HX0040-01-01 Instrumentation Electronics Mounted to Strongback 
HX0041-01-01 Hexapod Actuator Mounts to Strongback and Lower Hexapod 
Frame 
HX0042-01-01 Wide Field Corrector Mount to Strongback  
HX0043-01-01 Pupil Assembly Platform to Pupil Assembly Instruments 
HX0044-01-01 Rho Stage to Focal Plane Assembly Substructure 
HX0045-01-01 Tracker Computer to Telescope Computer System 
HX0046-01-01 Tracker Electrical Interfaces and Routing Control Document 
HX0047-01-01 Tracker Pneumatic Interfaces and Routing Control Document 
HX0048-01-01 Tracker Thermal Management System Interfaces and Routing 
Control Document 
 
Structural complexity generated by the system architecture is relatively easy to 
manage with respect to the well defined and pre-established interfaces that separate the 
major sub-functions of the Tracker.  However, a clear picture of architectural 
implications becomes more difficult to sustain as interfaces penetrate deeper into 
subsystems and finally reach the component level.  At lower levels of subsystem design, 
more latitude for interface choices exists, and likewise so does uncertainty with respect to 
their precise functional definition and in-process change control as designs evolve.  
Figure 3 illustrates the major subsystems, interfaces, and parties responsible for the 
design of each, but the list of collaborating stakeholders and respective interests that 
contribute to structural and social complexity does not stop there.  Research and 
development projects, and especially those that are marked by a measure of rarity in their 
scope and application, often seek to maximize their “one-time” value.  What is meant by 
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this statement, is that tremendous efforts will be made to incorporate the benefits of direct 
and indirect experiences; and to incorporate as many technological developments and 
practices developed in other similar projects as possible so that the “rare” project will 
surpass those that came before it to become the new benchmark design.  This becomes 
especially important when the project involves a university’s unique scientific research 
asset like the Hobby Eberly Telescope.  Therefore, the engineering objectives for the 
Tracker stretch beyond upgrading its performance and load capacity.  Stakeholders 
include HET and McDonald Observatory oversight boards, university consortia, and 
more directly involved participants such as astronomical research scientists, faculty, HET 
site operations personnel, and technical staff.  Significant communication and design 
input is required from these groups to maximize the future reliability, maintainability, and 
ultimately the long-term research value that the HET will provide for at least the next 
twenty years.  
In practical terms, exercising design freedom within subsystems and facilitating 
the interests of a large number of constituents can create many additional interfaces 
which may be introduced at virtually any phase of the design process.  Consequently, 
these ancillary interfaces are subjected to much less analysis, formal definition, 
documentation, and change control scrutiny than higher level system interfaces.  Yet, the 
effect they may have both individually and cumulatively on the overall system design can 
still be measurable due to their introduction of new design constraints and dependencies, 
thereby expanding the system’s overall complexity. 
2.3.   MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
Collaborative engagements contribute to the complexity and uncertainty of the 
design process, so why undertake them?  As complexity increases, so does the designer’s 
need for information and thus communication.  The design team itself becomes a 
complex system with its own requirements, dependencies, and objectives.  With 
increasing complexity, transparency into the consequences of decisions decreases, as 
does the predictability of decision outcomes [4], [12].  Yet, collaboration and uncertainty 
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are necessary to the design process, especially for enabling innovation in the research and 
development environment ([10], [16], and [17]).  Well-defined design problems that have 
predictable task progressions and unambiguous solutions rarely generate novel products 
[16].  Designing a new system for the first time often requires preliminary development 
of subsystem components in parallel just to generate the contextual information required 
to formulate an accurate design problem statement.  Finally, organizational logistics 
dictate that systems and subsystems must be separated at established interfaces to suit the 
availability of resources, and the appropriate functional disciplines and domain 
knowledge areas of the designers. 
The collaborative team environment and the system being designed together 
comprise a multi-domain system.  The diagram constructed by Weber (as presented in 
[12]) shown in Figure 5 depicts these as the “product and/or system domain” and the 
“process domain.”  The product domain refers to technically-oriented attributes of the 
product or system being designed, and the process domain refers to human resource, 
organization, and planning aspects of the design process.      
  
 
Figure 5: Complexity represented in the system domain and process domain 
(reproduced from [12]). 
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When discussing industrial or consumer products, the product domain and process 
domain may exist independently or exhibit different relationships throughout the various 
stages of the product lifecycle.  When the application of this model is narrowed to the 
design phase, I would make the assertion that the product domain exists co-dependently 
and within the process domain.  The two are subsequently referred to as the technical 
domain and social domain throughout this report, in order to add specificity to this model 
for the context of collaborative design.  The social domain was earlier referred to as the 
“second-order system.”  Elaborating on this analogy to system dynamics, the technical 
domain would represent a first-order system.  If the technical domain could be isolated, a 
change to a component design would represent a single step change in the state of the 
system.  When the technical and social domains are coupled, a change to a component 
design can incite changes from other designers and introduce design iterations, similar to 
the oscillating behavior of a second-order dynamic system. 
The critical item for managers to understand is the nature of the dynamics and 
uncertainty that are at work in the design process.  They cannot be completely isolated or 
eliminated.  Some information cannot be produced prior to the time at which its need it 
will become critical; and likewise some design approach decisions cannot be finalized 
without first attempting a baseline solution, despite the inevitability of rework.  In the 
frame of dynamic systems, this would be equivalent to stating that it is not always 
possible to predict how every element in a system is going to respond; not without first 
giving the system a small push to see how its interactions unfold.  This becomes 
increasingly true with the uncertainty of early-phase R&D and as system elements and 
collaborators grow in number.  The overarching management goals in the collaborative 
design process then become to 1) minimize iteration, and 2) understand the sources of 
system complexity and advantageously manipulate them whenever possible.  Achieving 
these goals can prevent designers from becoming overwhelmed in the collaborative 
design process and maintain higher levels of productivity [15].  The mechanism behind 
iteration is design information transfer, i.e. design information is the link or “spring” 
between two designers about which they will oscillate.  Complexity arises from the 
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information dependency relationships formed by the system structure and interfaces, and 
determines where and how the “springs” will be connected.   The next two chapters of 
this report concentrate on understanding these two components in practical application to 




3. Information Management 
 
The design development cycle consumes project information and resources and 
processes them to create the product of research and development engineering, which is 
all the design information necessary to realize the system and product [16].  Information 
inputs include requirements, specifications, budget, schedule, and stakeholder influences.  
Examples of information outputs include design documentation, project cost information, 
and project status information.  A vast amount of information is required to formulate and 
deliver a complete, engineered design.  It was shown in the previous section that, in the 
context of a system design, this quantity of information is directly proportional to the 
number of interfaces and interfaces are exponentially proportional to the number of 
components [16].   
In a collaborative project, barriers and impediments to effective communication 
can leave designers starving for relevant information, or similarly inundated with less 
consequential design objectives and constraints.  This is precisely why collaborative 
design projects are exceedingly more management intensive at all levels of responsibility, 
versus non-collaborative projects that predominantly give right of way to the technical 
issues [7].  This section of the report provides insight into the impacts uncertainty and 
complexity may have with respect to information and communication during the design 
phase of a collaborative research and development project. 
3.1.   INSTRUMENTALITY OF INFORMATION TO THE DESIGN PROCESS 
Partitioning a system into subsystems creates interfaces, and interfaces create the 
need for communication when ownership of subsystems and components is divided at the 
interface [16], [15].  It has also been shown that external interfaces are locations of 
concentrated design information, and complex interactions in sufficiently large systems 
require even greater information about the other subsystems.  This is only one facet of the 
designer’s information needs when designing a new subsystem component.  Apart from 
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the subsystem’s external and internal interfaces, a substantial amount of information is 
required simply to engineer the component itself.  Functional requirements, material 
properties, stress calculations, usage scenarios, and manufacturing cost estimates are just 
a few of the many types of detailed information an engineer or designer will use to 
formulate and refine a mechanical component design.  Additional time and effort will be 
dedicated to producing information output such as presentations for design reviews, 
design calculation records, prints for manufacture, inspection and acceptance criteria, 
user’s manual and assembly instructions.  As a practicing design engineer, I share the 
perception that the above obligations, which are seemingly tangent to the design process, 
tend to dominate over the effort expended “designing things.”  How significant is this 
really?  Management research studies involving practicing engineers, including those of a 
large auto company, support claims that engineers spend between 8% and 10% of their 
time performing actual design tasks [6].  Studies have also yielded somewhat conflicting, 
but no less illuminating data on what designers are doing with the other 90% of their 
remaining time: 
 
Getting the right information takes a lot of time during the design process. 
Statistical investigations with designers in practice report that it takes 
approximately 25-60% of their working time [7]. 
 
It has also been shown that engineering designers spend as much as 30% of their 
time searching for and accessing information.  To try and reduce this “non-
productive” time engineering designers tend to use the information that they 
already possess [6]. 
 
The closing statement of the latter quotation implies that, when confronted with an 
absence of required design information, engineering designers will default to experience 
or information already in their possession.  The conclusion left to be inferred is that this 
is likely to be sub-optimal information which is being used in the formation of a design 
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solution.  In a design scenario that involves a high level of complexity, such behavior is 
extrapolated to satisficing or, in another form, what has been referred to as an attempt at 
“taming” the problem [3].  An example of a taming behavior would be restating or 
rationalizing a difficult problem such that it appears more like a problem which has 
already been solved, regardless of whether or not the juxtaposition is truly valid [3].  
Studies involving practicing engineers seem to support this observation. 
 
Studies performed by Stauffer et al have shown that often their own [engineer’s] 
decisions are based on rules of thumb, personal preferences and even conjectures, 
which are formed when there is not enough information to know things with 
certainty, but enough to make an educated guess [6]. 
 
Before exploring the effects that this “default” response to insufficient information has in 
further detail, it is worth first looking at data that has been gathered regarding the design 
engineer’s preferred sources of information. 
 
In a survey of over 200 practicing engineering designers, reported that when 
starting a new task the following information sources were rated as Very 
Important: 
60% Colleagues 
34% Personal Contacts 
84% Personal Experience 
17% Representatives 
12% Consultancy [6] 
 
Interpersonal communication is also cited as being highly important when a high level of 
uncertainty is believed to exist [6].   
If the preferred source of information in situations involving uncertainty is, in 
fact, person-to-person communication, this would appear to be a benefit for collaborative 
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efforts, and especially those involving research and development engineering where 
substantial uncertainty exists.  Understanding from the very beginning that the project 
will depend heavily upon collaboration has the effect of forcing open the windows of 
communication at a much earlier phase in the project [17], [15].  These “meetings of the 
minds” are essential prior to beginning the actual work, as there is a much greater need to 
express and clarify each organization’s role, objectives, and expectations in order for the 
collaborative team to parcel the work, yet still remain cohesive over the long-term [15], 
[17].  Unfortunately, collaborating across organizations, and especially in teams 
comprised by a large number of individuals, becomes more difficult once each group 
becomes embroiled in their respective engineering design tasks.  Conflicting meeting 
schedules, travel schedules, missed connections, and pure willingness to accommodate 
unscheduled interruptions all become factors that contribute to lessened frequency and 
actual time duration spent collaborating.  The early paradigm of mutual exchanges begins 
to shift to one of placating the immediate needs of the information seeker versus the 
immediate preoccupation of the responder.  The fact that there are far fewer true 
collaborations than there are “transactions” at the mid-complete phase of a collaborative 
design project is a simple and understandable product of everyone’s desire to maintain 
individual progress  once the mutual objective is understood and the tasks have been 
defined.   It is immensely important, however, that the significance of each collaboration 
does not become underestimated – no matter where each team may be in their respective 
trajectories or how ever sparse their interactions might be.  A study conducted by 
Frankenberger and Badke-Schaub [7] exemplifies the reasoning behind this assertion: 
 
In spite of the fact that the designers worked for an average of 80% of their time 
individually, the importance of the group-related factors in “critical situations” 
becomes clear by the fact that 88% of the “critical situations” took place in 
collaborative work of the designers [7]. 
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The “critical situations” referred to within this context were defined as “...where the 
design process takes a new direction on a conceptual or embodiment design level” [7].  
Part of the reason for this apparently imbalanced weight of collaborative outcomes is that 
individuals contributing to a shared effort typically feel greater impetus to obtain 
consensus approval and acceptance for their ideas before making final commitment; 
versus when confronted by similar commitments when working in isolation [7].  The 
observation taken from the study referenced above has tremendous implications.  It 
suggests a measure of support for the earlier claim that the more frequent “transactional” 
transfers of information are initiated primarily to enable one’s continuance of work 
already underway; whereas truly collaborative exchanges most frequently produce, and 
are sometimes required to formulate decisions which are perceived as being critical to the 
path of the design process. 
Transactional information transfers may not be frequently attributed to pinpoint 
defining moments of the design process, but their cumulative effect should not be 
neglected either.  Returning to the implications of the “default response” of engineers, i.e. 
personal experience, rules, of thumb, and conjecture when adequate information is 
lacking, it can be seen that transactions are an essential component of collaborative 
design.  The same study conducted by Frankenberger and Badke-Schaub was also aimed 
at identifying external factors and design decision influences that directly affect design 
process outcomes like cost and quality.  “Factors and influences” were narrowed to such 
things as quality of solution analysis and solution decisions, quality of leadership, time 
pressure, and information availability.  What they found was that “quality of solution 
decisions” was the single most influential factor to positively or negatively influence 
overall design cost and quality [7].  They attributed “quality of design decisions” to 
“quality of design solution analysis,” which was most directly affected by the availability 
or unavailability of information [7]. 
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If the external conditions are characterized by time pressure, the resulting 
subjective time pressure of the individuals has additional negative effects on 
information transfer, analysis, and decision making activities [7]. 
 
This last finding from the study supports the following conclusion:  Designers will rely 
upon whatever information they may have available in order to construct a design 
decision when it is clear that time constraints have made reaching an immediate decision 
imperative. 
To conclude this dialogue, it should be noted that the underlying motive is not to 
portend that design engineers are lazy information gatherers or reckless decision makers.  
The truth is quite the opposite.  Otherwise, design engineers would not expend such vast 
portions of their overall time and effort seeking and producing design information, and 
such comparatively little time actually designing.  The “default response” of falling back 
on prior experience or conjecture is elicited by many factors such as schedule constraints, 
pressure from other colleagues, and task prioritization within the design process.  The 
purpose behind this discussion has been to reveal how instrumental the availability of 
information is to the design process; and to understand the interactive contexts in which it 
is most valuable so that information can be managed with methods that will maximize the 
value of collaboration rather than transforming it into an impediment or burden. 
3.2.   INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR THE HETDEX PROJECT 
The need for collaboration and information sharing, and amongst whom, within 
the HETDEX project was established in section two of this report.  This section has 
discussed the importance of information to the collaborative design process and how the 
cooperative context determines the real value of information and recommended method 
of transfer.  Examples from the HETDEX project will now be introduced to illustrate 
these ideas.  
The Prime Focus Instrument Platform, or PFIP, could be considered the most 
crucial subsystem included in the HETDEX upgrade by virtue of its interfaces alone.  
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The PFIP shares its main interfaces with the Tracker and it includes the Wide Field 
Corrector.  The WFC shares mechanical interfaces with the PFIP structure and Tracker 
hexapod, as well as optical interfaces with the HET primary mirror and scientific 
instruments (Figure 6).  The WFC collects and focuses the light that is reflected from the 
immense light-gathering surface of the primary mirror, thus it can be thought of as a set 
of prescription lenses which enable the HET’s instruments to view the stars.  If any of 
these system designs differ by even the slightest amount at their interfaces, mechanical or 
optical, the HET’s ability to carry out scientific research could be compromised. 
 
 
Figure 6: The Prime Focus Instrument Platform (right side view is sectioned at the 
mid-plane) interfaces and organizational division of responsibilities (CAD 
content created by CEM and University of Arizona). 
 
The interfaces that reside in the PFIP also signify some of the most critical design 
collaborations occurring within the project.  Engineers from McDonald Observatory, the 
Center for Electromechanics, University of Arizona, and ADS International must all 
contribute design information necessary to complete the engineering of this subsystem.  
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Transactional and collaborative design information transfers between these parties have 
been critical to design progress.  
Transactional information transfers are facilitated through the use of Product Data 
Management (PDM) software produced by the SolidWorksTM Corporation.  The 
SolidWorksTM Enterprise PDM product is integrated with the SolidWorksTM 3D 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) modeling environment.  PDM enables networked users 
to upload model and design data, documentation, and virtually any format of support file 
e.g. presentation, spreadsheet, photos, etc. to a central fileserver (referred to as the 
“Vault”); while also providing ownership information, user access rights, file revision 
control, and a number of data reporting features (see Figure 7 below).   
 
 
Figure 7: The SolidWorksTM PDM integrated user interface permits document 
reporting and tracking, and enables users to update component model 
information in real-time and from within the modeling environment. 
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The use of PDM and similar tools has become widespread and nearly essential to 
engineers and designers in sectors such as mechanical, software, and electronic product 
development [14]. 
The HETDEX Vault is administrated by CEM.  Early in the design phase, a 
crucial decision was made for McDonald Observatory engineers working on the 
HETDEX project to adopt the same design software platform and share Vault access 
rights with CEM5
Integrating PDM with CAD has enormous benefits for parallel and collaborative 
design.  The process of uploading CAD model data to the Vault, referred to as “vaulting,” 
is a many-times-daily occurrence on the HETDEX project.  The most practical 
implication is that any time a design team member updates a component design in the 
Vault, another user working in a CAD assembly containing that component model can, in 
real-time, execute the “reload” command and the component will automatically update 
on-screen with virtually no other interruption to productivity.  PDM is most appropriate 
and most effective for this type of passive information exchange [14] or, as Schrage 
makes the distinction, to transfer information rather than knowledge [17].  Although 
notes and supporting documents can be attached to CAD information, the primary 
function of PDM is to enable the transfer of technically rich data in a controlled and 
.  This has enabled direct engineer-to-engineer design information 
transfers between these two organizations.  Outside organizations like the University of 
Arizona and ADS Intl. are indirectly linked through a slightly less efficient, but still 
highly effective transfer process whereby technical data packages are sent electronically 
to a designated point of contact within CEM, and then transferred to the Vault for use by 
team members.  Most often this is accomplished through secure internet FTP transfer, 
where an FTP host address is created to serve as an electronic “drop-box” for the duration 
of the project. 
                                                 
5 The decision to adopt a common CAD and PDM software platform has had additional benefits that extend 
beyond data management.  Although most commercial CAD software platforms have the ability to convert 
model data saved in their native file format to a standardized file format (such as STEP or IGES), the 
accuracy of converted  models is not guaranteed, and the ability to exchange conveniently editable models 
is often lost thereby reducing their utility for collaborative work. 
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sequential manner [14].  It is transactional in the sense that a discrete parcel of data is 
packaged, transmitted, and received by one who may then process the information “as-
received.”  Otherwise, supplemental communication such as telephone or email must be 
initiated in a secondary exchange.  Therefore, PDM is a highly efficient tool for 
managing technical interchanges, but in the collaborative environment it has limitations 
for managing conceptually rich information and enabling participatory exchanges. 
Data from the research study introduced in the section of the report preceding this 
one suggested that nearly 90% of “critical” design events and decisions occurred in 
participatory design collaborations.  The next example from HETDEX recounts an event 
which demonstrates this conclusion.  Section two of this report made reference to the 
number of stakeholders and considerations that are represented in the set of Tracker 
design objectives.  One pivotal event in the Tracker design process contributed more 
design and interface decisions in advancement toward overall design objectives than 
perhaps any other.  This event was a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
conducted jointly between CEM and MDO.  This face-to-face meeting initialized with 
both teams near-fully represented in the same conference room.  The few who could not 
be present were able to participate via telephone and internet conferencing.   The FMEA 
process involves agreeing upon rating scales for failure likelihood within a given time 
period and resulting magnitude of injury in terms of dollars, assets, or to personnel.  
Next, the major failure modes of each subsystem are identified, and the effects of failure 
to the overall system are determined.  In accordance with the severity of outcome and 
likelihood, the rating scales are applied and a final risk rating is given to each failure 
mode.  After the ratings have been compiled, a remediation plan for the design is 
constructed and priority is assigned (Table 2). 
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Table 2: An example taken from the HETDEX Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
exercise.  Note: “RPN” refers to Risk Priority Number, which is used to 
prioritize risk mitigation design tasks. 
 
 
Conducting an FMEA with the level of detail and number of parties represented 
by HETDEX is obviously time intensive.  The full-group meeting took place over two 
days before splintering into assignments between pairs consisting of one CEM and one 
MDO engineer.  As the results of the collaborative design research study would imply, 
the outcome of this collaboration was a number of highly important adjustments to the 
Tracker design.  Some were minor in scope, such as revisions to safety switches and 
control interlocks, while others redefined interfaces and added or removed whole 
subsystems.  Another significant outcome was an overall refinement to the functional 
requirement definition of several subsystems which still contained a degree of ambiguity 
beforehand.  These types of design decision outcomes stand in stark contrast to those that 
would, or even could be enabled with passive information transfer.  The heart of the 
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take place interactively, and proportionate weighting reflects their real value to the 
stakeholder.   
3.3.   INFORMATION MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
One of the conclusions reached in the HETDEX project example is that PDM is a 
highly efficient tool for managing technical interchanges, but in the collaborative 
environment it has limitations for managing conceptually rich information and enabling 
participatory exchanges.  The effect this last statement has on the design process, in the 
context of a PDM-linked workgroup, needs to be understood because system complexity 
will only make it more crucial.  This environment, coupled with a flat organizational 
structure (common in many engineering and design project organizations), means passive 
information transfer will frequently occur at the lowest nodes of the network i.e. at the 
level of the individual responsible for a particular subsystem or component.  This has the 
implication that visibility into the social domain of the system described earlier may be 
limited at the team and manager level.  Changes manifest in the components of the 
system.  Each designer becomes aware of the changes as components are updated in 
iterative and sequential fashion.  They make the newly required modifications to their 
component and send it up to the network.  If things were left this way, without 
supplemental communication, change propagation two or more persons removed from 
the change originator would be virtually invisible and therefore rarely communicated 
upward to the manager or to the team at-large.  
The effect “good solution analysis” and information availability have on design 
quality and cost was another significant conclusion from collaborative design research 
[7], [15].  PDM can significantly benefit design quality by virtue of enabling common 
and consistent design information so that designs will satisfy their requirements at their 
interfaces.  Cost is a separate issue.  In terms of information transfer efficiency and 
quality after the design is transferred to manufacture, PDM is a benefit.  However, it can 
also contribute significantly to project cost by obscuring excessive design iteration and 
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diverting attention away from interface and solution analysis by fixating individual 
designer’s attention on component design issues.  
Participatory collaboration can be time consuming and carries with it a substantial 
project burden when full team member presence is required.  However, it is also 
instrumental to early and late “critical situations” within the design process.  When such 
collaboration environments are scheduled to materialize ahead of time, such as design 
reviews and team meetings, their value should be maximized by reporting and probing 
architecture level design decisions to gain greater transparency into the dynamics of the 
social system domain.  They are also the most effective environment to initiate 
participatory exchanges to resolve uncertain or ambiguous information that may be 
impeding design progress. 
These conclusions create the framework for the central management 
recommendation.  Information needs and medium of communication should be 
considered early in the design project planning phase, and throughout the project as it 
develops.  This seems as though it would be obvious, but how often do “information 
needs” really take center stage before the subjects of resource levels, task durations, and 
budgets in initial project planning?  It has been shown that seeking, accessing, and 
processing information is a significant factor in total process time, rework iteration, and 
quality, and will therefore determine a large share of the design project’s schedule and 
capital needs.  The decision to use a common CAD and PDM platform between 
collaborators on the HETDEX project was more than just a sensible choice.  There were 
costs for the other party to adopt the software in the form of license fees and time 
required to adapt, but the costs are heavily outweighed by the rapidity and quality of 
design information exchange that it has enabled.  Danilovic and Sandkull summarize the 
questions that must be asked: 
 
Who needs to communicate to whom in order to solve their tasks?  What kind of 
information needs to be exchanged?  Why is this information exchange important 
to other people?  When should this information exchange take place?  How 
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should people involved share the needed information with each other in order to 
handle interdependencies? [4]. 
 
The question of how should information exchanges take place refers to the choice of 
medium and process, which requires the answer to at least two additional questions: Is 
the information needed in order to resolve substantial uncertainty or ambiguity?  Is the 
real need one of transferring the required information, or actually creating the required 
information?  When uncertainty is high and/or the objective is to create information, 
interactive and participatory exchanges should be initiated, as illustrated by the HETDEX 
FMEA example.  When the inverse is true, passive and automated communication 
methods are suitable and likely to be more efficient.  A final factor to consider is the 
frequency with which the information will be accessed and by whom.  With high 
frequency and number of designers requiring access, the cost of documenting and 
consolidating information is often far less than the cost of repetitive searches, though this 
is not always true.  For example, attaching supplier information, purchase dates, and 
manufacturing cost information to every component in a PDM database is a valid effort 
for recurring engineering and design projects, but it would not necessarily provide 
positive earned value to a one-time project or to a collaborative team that will dissolve 
upon project completion. 
In light of the recommendation to bring information exchange and communication 
needs to the forefront of collaborative project planning, a practical means of identifying 
those needs at an early project stage will be required.  One such method will be 
introduced in subsequent sections. 
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4. Complexity Management 
 
If higher degrees of system and project complexity make collaborative design 
more difficult to manage, it would seem that the obvious solution would be to develop 
methods to simplify the systems involved.  This is a laudable goal, and one that may even 
be practical to accomplish in some scenarios.  The word “complexity” has been used 
many times throughout this report, and further understanding of the underlying concept 
within the context of collaborative engineering and design of complex systems will 
expose the inherent difficulty of “simplification.”  Complexity as presented in this report 
means, at its core, that prodigious changes to the order and structure of any system which 
possesses sufficient quantities of elements and strength of interrelationships to actually be 
deemed “complex” will only create new interrelationships that are no less easy to manage 
or more immediately transparent in their implications.  Put another way, it may be 
possible to reduce or isolate complexity at local nodes within the system, but drastic 
simplification of interfaces and relationships would create impractical requirements for 
the component and its designer to fulfill, or manifests in an undesired modification to the 
global function of the system ([12], [16], and [18]).  The resulting conflict is often 
encountered in complex systems that require high reliability.  Simplification is necessary 
to reduce the number of functions one subsystem is required to perform, therefore 
reducing that subsystem’s probability of failing to perform at least one of its functions 
[18].  If functional simplification cannot be achieved without altering the function of the 
global system, then it may be necessary to have redundant systems performing the same 
set of functions [18]. 
The above conflict arises in tightly integrated systems, and especially those that 
involve functional overlap i.e. more than one subsystem contributes to a single system-
level function [18].  The same qualities contribute uncertainty – the next element of 
difficulty encountered in complex systems.  Technical and social uncertainty both grow 
with the number of elements in the system due to the number of system variables and 
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respective strength of influence over system qualities [4].  “The variability of the system 
will approach the variability of its most variable component” (Reinertsen, [16]).  A 
structurally stable technical and social system will attenuate the disturbances caused by 
small design changes, and an unstable one will amplify them.  Section two of this report 
showed how system architecture contributes to complexity.  Section three illustrated that 
the complexity of the architecture drives organizational needs for information and 
communication, which are immensely critical to collaborative design.  This section of the 
report will show how the very technical explanation of complexity given above translates 
to the practical world of design management.  Namely, how complex systems can be 
visualized, understood, and manipulated even when they are not readily simplified. 
4.1.   DEPENDENCY: THE SOURCE OF DIFFICULTY IN COMPLEX PROBLEMS 
Restating the central issue: complexity is a product of the quantity of interfaces 
and the relative magnitude of interdependency each interface creates between 
components.  Returning to the PC design example will help illustrate this point.  In the 
example, the supply voltage was listed as one parameter shared at the interface between 
the video adapter card and the motherboard; i.e. the voltage received by the video card 
depends on how many volts the motherboard supplies to the connector.  Suppose that the 
motherboard design is in its preliminary phase and the motherboard designer knows only 
that it will supply some specific value within a range of 1 to 12 volts.  In this scenario, 
the video card can be completely configured with components that will all function 
normally with a supply voltage anywhere between 1 and 12 volts.  The fact that the 
motherboard designer can only provide highly uncertain information at this time is almost 
immaterial to the video card designer.  A refined estimate of the exact supply voltage 
would contribute little value because the video card’s design is not dependent upon which 
value between one and twelve is ultimately decided.  Stated formally, resolving 
uncertainty at the information source is less important when minimal dependency exists 
at the information receiver.  Now consider the same scenario with the exception that the 
video card designer must choose only one of two possible sets of subcomponents.   The 
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first of these sets will only operate on 1-6 volts, and the second on 6-12 volts.  Now the 
video card’s design is highly dependent upon the estimated supply voltage and it’s 
unlikely that components can be specified without first obtaining better information.  
Resolving uncertainty at the information source is critical to the information receiver 
when stronger dependency exists.  
The interplay between variability and dependency is the tool with which complex 
systems can be manipulated to manage collaborative design productivity.  In the PC 
design example from section two of this report, the interface parameter of the video card 
connector’s orientation on the motherboard was used to illustrate the difference between 
the two-component scenario and the broader system scenario, and it shall do the same 
here.  The dependency between the video card’s orientation inside the PC and the 
orientation of the connector at its interface was a full one-to-one correlation.  Rotating the 
connector some number of degrees rotates the video card by the exact same amount.  
Furthermore, other dependencies were found to exist between other components at this 
interface once the design change was implemented.  The variability brought to light by 
the motherboard designer’s change had maximum impact at the system level (in both the 
technical and social domains) because the dependency correlation was very strong and 
extended across multiple interfaces.  If the variability and complexity surrounding the 
connector interface had been better understood beforehand, it might have been adjusted 
accordingly.  One possible solution would be to reduce the strength of dependency 
correlation at that particular interface.  The solution might be as simple as linking the 
video card to the motherboard with a flexible cable instead of fixed connectors, so that it 
can more easily satisfy numerous other system constraints without successive rounds of 
design iteration. 
Proposing that interfaces should be evaluated and adjusted in terms of intangible 
attributes like variability and dependency relationships is a high-level and perhaps even 
esoteric way of thinking that seems to overlook the obvious power of design intuition and 
ingenuity, so what added value does it generate?  The value lies in its ability to provide 
traction in addressing the problem with extremely complex systems – which is that the 
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solutions are no longer intuitive.  Or more accurately, the full downstream consequences 
of a proposed solution are much more opaque and difficult to evaluate than it is to 
recognize when an intuitively derived solution seems to address the immediately visible 
design problem.  Yet, it is easier and more effective over the full term of the design 
process to start with the right questions than it is to construct more and more solutions as 
each one reveals new and unforeseen systemic faults [4].  
 
The importance of interfaces is often overlooked because we are constantly lured 
away by the concrete nature of module design ...When you have a design 
problem, and ask what needs to be changed to fix it, the answer is always a 
component, so you conclude that the component was the cause of the problem.  In 
reality, for many systems the root cause of component redesign is really poor 
interface design (Reinertsen, [16]).  
 
The compartmentalization of responsibility inherent to collaborative work makes 
this an even easier pitfall to slip into, and there are often reasons why it may be 
impossible to avoid on a given project.  The partitioning line between subsystems 
becomes an increasingly concretized divider of group and organizational responsibilities 
as the project progresses.  Therefore, significant external pressure exists for issues 
developed or manifested within a subsystem to be resolved by the responsible owner, and 
with relatively little attention paid to the interface which is perceived as being rigid [16].  
As alluded to, there are some instances where the interfaces must be inflexible, such as 
those whose constraints extend to the social domain where the interface also demarcates a 
separation of domain knowledge or contractual obligations, for example.  It is very likely 
that managers and designers involved in collaborative design projects will be forced to 
live with at least some rigid interfaces and their attendant dependencies.  Therefore, the 
need to understand and communicate the implications of such dependencies to the 
opposite stakeholder, and also to manipulate system variables and structure within one’s 
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own boundaries, becomes highly important to mitigating negative dependency constraints 
and maintaining productivity. 
4.2.   HETDEX COMPLEXITY AND TOOLS FOR MANAGEMENT 
Understanding and managing complexity is one of the most difficult challenges 
posed by the collaboration to design a new Tracker for the HETDEX upgrade.  The 
Hobby Eberly Telescope is, itself, a very sophisticated machine that relies upon 
numerous mechanical, electrical, and computerized subsystems to carry out the complex 
and precisely orchestrated function of tracking and measuring starlight emanating from 
incredible distances away.  There are also numerous design factors that influence how 
well the telescope will be able to perform this function which must receive consideration; 
from the speed and precision of its servo-drive mechanisms, down to what type and brand 
of paint is used on them (in order to prevent unwanted light reflection).  The nature of the 
project, which is to enable new scientific discoveries, also pushes the design process to 
achieve some technical objectives that approach the extreme outer boundary of what’s 
possible under current engineering research and development projects.  Many new and 
novel solutions to new design problems are required and system-level integration and 
optimization present significant challenges.  Because the Tracker system architecture is 
complex and highly interlaced in terms of both interfaces and design requirements, 
design decisions require hefty consideration and oftentimes the involvement of several 
team members to represent each relevant domain knowledge area.  Section three provided 
examples of how different types of information and information exchanges were utilized 
in the HETDEX project.  The discussion that follows in this section will introduce a 
method for evaluating the project’s technical and social information in order to analyze 
design decisions, and to understand their implications in the context of the system design 
and the collaboration environment. 
Despite the fact that many of the Tracker’s major subsystems had been 
established by its predecessor designs, the redesign of the Tracker system for HETDEX 
has led to revisions in the quantity and location of subsystem interfaces, and even the 
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number and type of subsystems present on the Tracker.  Efforts were made to focus on 
these types of decisions and restrict them as much as possible to early design phases, but 
evolving system designs in research and development project environments will 
inevitably lead to some changes occurring much later than would be ideal.  Of these, 
some may precipitate heavy rework penalties, while others may be cost-free or even cost-
saving.  The number and strength of dependencies affected within the system determine 
which category will describe a proposed design change [12].  When design involves 
collaboration and concerns a complex system such as the Tracker, the shortcomings of 
intuitively evaluating design decisions and their consequences, which were described 
above, become apparent.  Intuitive design evaluation methods are prone to overlook less 
obvious system interactions, meaning awareness of their consequences will not exist until 
after the change has been implemented.  Included in this set of consequences are the 
interactions in the social domain, which are very difficult to perceive intuitively.  A 
primary motivator in researching the topic of complexity management for this report was 
to uncover practical methods for understanding the complexity of the design environment 
and systematically evaluating design change implications over a more complete 
spectrum.  Unlike the use of PDM for information management, the following 
complexity management tool has not been implemented on the HETDEX project prior to 
the work performed for this report and development of its application is ongoing.   
The Dependency Structure Matrix (DSM), also referred to as a design precedence 
matrix, problem solving matrix, and design structure matrix to name a few of its aliases 
[11], is a graphically represented model of system dependency interactions.  Constructing 
the basic matrix is fairly straightforward, but its real contribution of enabling various 
forms of system analysis is performed using more complex mathematical algorithms.  A 
detailed discussion regarding the construction and use of dependency structure matrices 
is outside the scope of this report, though additional information can be found within the 
appendix and references [4] [5] [11] [12] and [13].  A DSM for a selected sample of the 




Figure 8: Each ‘X’ in the Dependency Structure Matrix for the baseline HETDEX 
Tracker design reflects mechanical interfaces shared between major 
component subgroups corresponding to each number, as well as 
directionality of design change propagation.  Cells shaded red indicate co-
dependencies and subsequent potential for iterative design rework. 
 
One obvious application of DSM is to provide qualitative comparison of the dependency 
structures between various design alternatives.  Figure 9 reflects a new dependency 
structure after several design changes were made intuitively during the design’s 
evolution.  To summarizing these changes: The subgroup ‘PFIP Upper Hexapod’ was 
eliminated from the design.  ‘Upper Hexapod Frame’ and ‘WFC Strongback’ were 
merged into one subsystem.  Finally, the ‘Lower Hexapod Plate’ component was added 
and provides a buffer interface between ‘Lower Hexapod Frame’ and ‘Hexapod Struts.’ 
 
Name # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Lower X-axis bearing trolley 1 1
Lower X-axis screw drive 2 X 2
Upper X-axis bearing trolley 3 3
Upper X-axis screw drive 4 X 4
Tracker bridge 5 X X 5 X X
Y-axis screw drive 6 X 6 X
Y-axis bearing trolley (Left) 7 7
Y-axis bearing trolley (Right) 8 8
Lower hexapod frame 9 X X 9 X
Hexapod struts 10 X 10 X
Upper Hexapod frame 11 11 X
Wide Field Corrector (WFC) 12 X X 12 X
WFC strongback 13 X 13
PFIP support structure 14 14
PFIP upper hexapod 15 15 X
PFIP Rho stage 16 X X 16
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Figure 9: HETDEX Tracker Dependency Structure Matrix following changes to the 
component subgroup architecture. 
 
The second Tracker DSM reveals the modified architecture contains fewer co-
dependencies.  However, the total number of dependencies is only reduced by two.  
Conclusions as to why this is true can be drawn from the two figures: Completely 
eliminating one subgroup eliminated all of its associated dependencies; merging two 
subgroups redistributed dependencies; and introduction of a new subgroup, called 
‘Hexapod Plate,’ between two interfaces created new dependencies.  Insight as to why 
‘Hexapod Plate’ was added will underscore the value of DSM methods.  ‘Lower Hexapod 
Frame’ was a complex and multi-functional component under the stewardship of CEM in 
Austin, Texas.  The ‘Hexapod Struts’ subgroup design was engaged by ADS 
International of Italy, and execution of its design began at a later date.  According to 
Reinertsen, “Communications will be worst if we compound the problem by placing an 
undefined interface on top of both an organization boundary and a geographic boundary” 
[16].  Due to the later start date and communication boundaries, this is a scenario where 
variability is high and means to resolve uncertainty are restricted.  The ‘Hexapod Plate’ 
component subgroup added structural complexity by adding interfaces, but doing so also 
Name # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Lower X-axis bearing trolley 1 1
Lower X-axis screw drive 2 X 2
Upper X-axis bearing trolley 3 3
Upper X-axis screw drive 4 X 4
Tracker bridge 5 X X 5 X X
Y-axis screw drive 6 X 6
Y-axis bearing trolley (Left) 7 7
Y-axis bearing trolley (Right) 8 8
Lower hexapod frame 9 X X 9
Lower hexapod plate 10 X 10
Hexapod struts 11 X X 11 X
Upper hexapod frame / WFC Strongback 12 12 X
Wide Field Corrector (WFC) 13 X X X 13 X
PFIP support structure 14 14
PFIP Rho stage 15 X 15
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meant the co-dependency between the two interfaces was resolved, and the variability 
was then confined to one simple and easy to change component.  Design iteration and 
each designer’s dependency on timely information transfer in order to maintain 
productivity were subsequently reduced through this manipulation of system dependency 
and variability. 
DSM gains additional value when combined with analytical algorithms and 
software.  An example of further DSM capabilities can be found in the Appendix of this 
report.  The DSM examples constructed here were created using basic, freely-
distributable software tools.  Commercial software has been investigated for future 
project applications as part of this research.  The matrices presented above are “binary,” 
meaning dependencies either do, or do not exist.  More sophisticated programs allow for 
numerical values, permitting variation in the strength of dependency which adds another 
parameter of system control.  The most developed commercial DSM products also 
support Multi-Domain-Matrices (MDM) which link dimensions of the product, process 
planning, and social domains and contain algorithms for generating alternative system 
structures.  
Research interest in DSM analysis methods grew sharply in the 1990’s, and 
notable contributions have since been made in complex design environments such as the 
auto industry ([4], [11], and [12]).  The potential benefit of these tools, and likewise the 
motivation behind their ongoing development, can be seen from the HETDEX example. 
When system complexity and design dependency can be visualized in a lucid format, 
systemic consequences of design changes and alternative proposals become easier to 
evaluate a priori. 
4.3.   COMPLEXITY MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The concept of complexity was further developed at the beginning of this 
discussion into the idea that when the number of interrelated system subcomponents is 
very high, and the interrelationships form an overlapping network rather than a strict 
hierarchy, the full implications of design choices become more difficult to predict.  
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Complexity is also shared between the design of components in the technical domain and 
the collaborative interaction between designers in the social domain.  Finally, the root 
cause of difficulty in managing complex system designs lies in interfaces and 
interrelationships that create dependency, either with respect to design information or the 
embodiment of the design solution. 
Recommendations for complexity management begin first with a comment on 
how we view design, especially in parallel and collaborative design situations.  
Traditional project management tools, such as Gantt charts, are able to incorporate 
aspects of design task dependency and overlap, yet they still represent a very linearized 
view of the design process.  The Project Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) 
improves upon this view by transforming similar project management information into a 
“node and vector” network of tasks, which is a closer representation of the collaborative 
network.  These two methods concentrate on critical path management, however, where 
the objective is to create forecasts based on resource usage and task durations.  These two 
variables are manipulated to satisfy an estimated project completion schedule and budget.  
When information is updated, the changes propagate serially from the origin of change to 
the end of the project (when the change has influence over the critical path), hence the 
term Critical “Chain” Project Management (CCPM), or Critical Path Management ([4], 
[13], and [14]).  The shortcoming of such CCPM methods exposed by highly complex 
and collaborative projects is this “chain” representation where events feed-forward 
through the chain.  Although task dependency can be represented relatively well with 
Gantt and PERT models, they provide precious little insight for managing information 
flow and iteration due to the absence of task feedback  and looping ([4], [13], and [14]).  
It has been shown that additional complexity in technical and social systems introduces 
more subtle dynamic behavior.  Changes “ripple and bounce” rather than “flow,” by 
virtue of generating both feed-forward and feedback responses throughout the system. 
The first recommendation is a generalized conclusion from the discussion above:  
Complex collaborative design projects must be thought of as being different from design 
projects with simpler interactions and much less uncertainty.  Obviously, this wouldn’t be 
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a very useful recommendation without suggesting in which ways the two differ.  
Returning to the statement: “The variability of the system will approach the variability of 
its most variable component” [16]; Reinertsen’s assertion is based on the principle that a 
sufficiently large collection of variable designs or design tasks will converge on the 
variability of the least certain element, because the number of positive outcomes and 
number of negative outcomes will, for the most part, average over the course of the 
design process [16].  It is for this reason that CCPM methods are still able to provide 
validity when the tasks are highly variable, but sufficient in quantity to offset each other.  
However, complex collaborative projects require an alternative, or at least supplemental 
viewpoint because: 1) Variability is an input to, not an output from CCPM methods and 
therefore it does not generate any additional insight into managing the variable element 
itself, and 2) The “law of averages” outlook inherently dilutes information such that it 
provides much less utility and accuracy in evaluating specific design decisions at discrete 
points along the way.  Furthermore, it does not fully account for variability or 
dependency that fluctuates and migrates as the design process unfolds, which occurs 
regularly in the R&D setting; and there is little to bring “self-energized” variables and 
rework loops hidden within the system architecture to light.    
Additional planning tools and visualization methods, such as the Dependency 
Structure Matrix methods discussed in the previous section, should be employed in such 
scenarios where complexity and variability are high.  Multi-Domain-Matrix tools go a 
step further and provide even finer granularity for evaluating design decisions in the 
technical domain, social domain, and design process planning domain.  The final, and 
most important point of difference behind this recommendation, is that dependencies 
must also be brought to the forefront of collaborative design management in tandem with 
information management.  Information needs are both an input to, and output from the 
dependency matrix.  Identifying information dependencies which exist as a result of 
structural complexity aids information exchange process planning, and provides the 
necessary picture of rework potential and rework impact that will augment traditional 
CCPM planning in collaborative efforts. 
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 It is vital that the nature of system dependencies be understood, and that they can 
vary both in strength and directionality.  The ability to evaluate system relationships in a 
quantitative and systematically rigorous way with DSM positively supplements intuitive 
design evaluation with thoroughness, objective and consistent comparison of alternatives, 
and utility in formulating pro-active design architecture decisions. 
The second set of recommendations is a more practical application of complexity 
theory, and already familiar to many in design practice.  One of which has already been 
practiced on the HETDEX project in the form of incorporating uncertainty margins for 
individual component mass budgets.  The uncertainty margins were then reduced as 
designs became more mature.  It was stated before that dependency and variability were 
two parameters that could be manipulated to manage complexity.  Design margins are 
one such method of reducing dependency correlation across interfaces, and it therefore 
creates a buffer to absorb a given amount of variability [1].  The corollary to design 
margins is: When dependency cannot be adequately reduced and relative uncertainty is 
very high, it may be possible to isolate them from other components in the system 
through appropriate interface selection ([1], [12], [16] and [18]).  The PC design example 
achieved this by adding the ribbon cable component, which decoupled two component 
interfaces, as did the addition of the ‘Hexapod Plate’ component in the HETDEX project.  
A third option is to exercise managerial options with respect to design task prioritization.  
It is possible to satisfy many design objectives and dependencies with partially complete 
designs.  There is typically no requirement that a design’s evolution must be continuous, 
although there are some negative consequences associated with interrupting design 
progress.  This option becomes attractive in the aforementioned instances when 
externally imposed interfaces are rigid and uncertainty is high.  The aim is to avoid 
“overinvesting” in a design such that only the necessary design information is produced 
and reflexive variability can impose no more than the minimum amount of rework.  All 
of these recommendations are practical incarnations of Suh’s logical theorem to reduce 
“system stiffness” [18] i.e. it’s resistance and sensitivity to change. 
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In summary, complexity management should concentrate on understanding the 
dynamics of the collaborative process, making design solution decisions in accordance 
with a system-based perspective, and remaining flexible and adaptable when feedback 
begins to flow in.  Tools such as DSM and MDM analysis exist, and should be used to 
pinpoint critical decisions and collaborative exchanges to be monitored by management, 





Schrage asserts that we engage in collaboration when faced with a problem that 
we’re unable to solve on our own [17].  This is the real value of collaborating in R&D 
design projects – To engage more difficult problems and elevate ingenuity beyond the 
capabilities of any single group or organization involved.  There are many buzzwords 
presently circulating the design management community collectively referred to as 
“Design for X,” where X may be quality, manufacture, reliability, etc.  The concept of 
viewing collaborative design as a technical system and social system discussed in this 
report implies that we should also “design for collaboration.”  Just as designers are 
responsible for the design of systems and components, managers are responsible for 
designing the framework of interactions, processes, and monitors that transpire in the 
social domain. 
The important conclusions contained in this report are as follows:  The selection 
of interfaces between components, subsystems, people, and organizations which 
comprise the system architecture will determine the information and communication 
needs of the project.  Information gathering and processing is perhaps the most critical 
factor determining design productivity and quality.  Complexity makes gathering the 
right information at the right time more difficult, and obscures the impact such 
information will have once it is received.  The challenges of managing collaborative 
design revolve around uncertainty and potential for hindered or wasted effort as the 
number of variable elements and people involved grow in number.  Information 
challenges can be addressed by recognizing what needs to be exchanged, how the 
exchange should occur, and when, based on the dependency relationship and whether the 
need is for transfer or creation.  Complexity challenges can be addressed similarly, by 
recognizing dependency relationships at an early stage, determining whether or not they 
are directional or iterative, and prioritizing to either resolve uncertainty or mitigate the 
strength of dependency so that designers may continue in their efforts unimpeded. 
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Appendix 
This appendix is intended to provide further explanation and expand upon the 
Dependency Structure Matrix example introduced in section 4.2 of this report.  For 
comprehensive discussion of dependency matrix methods consult references [4] [5] [11] 
[12] and [13].   
The baseline HETDEX Tracker DSM was constructed by analyzing the flow of 
mechanical design information between components and subsystems.  Figure A1 
illustrates how directionality of information is determined from the DSM. 
 
 
Figure A1: HETDEX Tracker baseline Dependency Structure Matrix depicting 










































































































































































Name # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Lower X-axis bearing trolley 1 1
Lower X-axis screw drive 2 X 2
Upper X-axis bearing trolley 3 3
Upper X-axis screw drive 4 X 4
Tracker bridge 5 X X 5 X X
Y-axis screw drive 6 X 6 X
Y-axis bearing trolley (Left) 7 7
Y-axis bearing trolley (Right) 8 8
Lower hexapod frame 9 X X 9 X
Hexapod struts 10 X 10 X
Upper Hexapod frame 11 11 X
Wide Field Corrector (WFC) 12 X X 12 X
WFC strongback 13 X 13
PFIP support structure 14 14
PFIP upper hexapod 15 15 X
PFIP Rho stage 16 X X 16
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The arrows represent the logic that should be followed to read the DSM.  When 
beginning with the row, the item in the row is said to pass information to the item in the 
column when the two share a dependency indicated by a mark in the cell shared by the 
row and column.  Marks above the diagonal feed information forward, and marks below 
the diagonal feed information backward, as indicated by the sequence in which they 
appear in the matrix.  The DSM in Figure A1 would be interpreted as: The Lower 
Hexapod Frame receives information from the Tracker Bridge, and sends information to 
the Y-Axis Bearing Trolley.  If the sequence of the matrix is considered, the relationship 
can be further decomposed as follows: The Tracker Bridge feeds information forward to 
the Lower Hexapod Frame.  The Lower Hexapod Frame feeds information back to the Y-
Axis Bearing Trolley.  Figure A2 provides a block diagram of this relationship. 
 
 
Figure A2: The information flow of the Tracker DSM in Figure A1 represented as a 
block diagram.  Information feed-forward and feedback would occur if 
design activities were sequenced this way. 
 
It can be seen from the block diagram representation that the DSM may be used to 
facilitate identification of iterative information dependencies and potentially less than 
ideal task sequences depending on the direction of information flow.  The term 
“partitioning” the matrix means reordering the entries such that feed-forward 
relationships are maximized and feedback dependencies are minimized (Figure 3).  This 
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can be accomplished manually, but may be impractical for large matrices and therefore 
the use of software is preferred.  A freely-distributable spreadsheet software add-in 
(available from [11]) was used to construct the examples that follow. 
 
 
Figure A3: The Tracker DSM after it has been partitioned (reordered) to maximize 
forward information flow.  The new sequence is indicated at the left, and 
proceeds from the bottom up. 
The sequence of the original matrix was chosen somewhat arbitrarily based upon the 
spatial location and grouping of components on the Tracker, not by the order of design 
tasks.  DSM may also be used in this manner to derive a baseline task sequence, though 
many additional factors may need consideration and pairing with Gantt or PERT methods 
may provide additional value.  Note that the software routine used here employs a “lower 
triangular” convention and moves dependencies below the diagonal, therefore the 
sequence is ordered from bottom to top.  An “upper triangular” convention is also 
frequently used [11], and each may find a preference depending on the application e.g. 
software design versus mechanical design. 
New 
Seq. Name # 1 3 7 8 14 2 4 11 15 16 9 10 13 5 6 12
16 Lower X-axis bearing trolley 1 1
15 Upper X-axis bearing trolley 3 3
14 Y-axis bearing trolley (Left) 7 7
13 Y-axis bearing trolley (Right) 8 8
12 PFIP support structure 14 14
11 Lower X-axis screw drive 2 X 2
10 Upper X-axis screw drive 4 X 4
9 Upper Hexapod frame 11 X 11
8 PFIP upper hexapod 15 15 X
7 PFIP Rho stage 16 X X 16
6 Lower hexapod frame 9 X X 9 X
5 Hexapod struts 10 X X 10
4 WFC strongback 13 X 13
3 Tracker bridge 5 X X X 5 X
2 Y-axis screw drive 6 X X 6
1 Wide Field Corrector (WFC) 12 X X X 12
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 “Banding” a DSM (Figure A4) refers to identifying groups of elements that are 
independent from each other.  The items within each “band” do not share any information 
dependencies with each other, and if the items represent tasks they may therefore be 
conducted in parallel with each other. 
 
  
Figure A4: The un-partitioned DSM (left) and partitioned DSM (right) as they appear 
after banding.  Note that reordering the matrix has enabled more tasks to be 
potentially conducted in parallel. 
 Finally, DSM may be coupled with additional analysis capabilities to estimate 
project cycle-time.  Monte-Carlo analysis was performed for the HETDEX example, 
though the task time estimates were chosen arbitrarily and used only to explore the 
implications of dependency relationships comparatively.  The analysis begins with task 
duration estimates and a “learning curve” estimate (Table A1).  Learning curve refers to 
the percentage of the original task duration required to complete each subsequent 
iteration. 
  
Name # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Lower X-axis bearing trolley 1 1
Lower X-axis screw drive 2 X 2
Upper X-axis bearing trolley 3 3
Upper X-axis screw drive 4 X 4
Tracker bridge 5 X X 5 X X
Y-axis screw drive 6 X 6 X
Y-axis bearing trolley (Left) 7 7
Y-axis bearing trolley (Right) 8 8
Lower hexapod frame 9 X X 9 X
Hexapod struts 10 X 10 X
Upper Hexapod frame 11 11 X
Wide Field Corrector (WFC) 12 X X 12 X
WFC strongback 13 X 13
PFIP support structure 14 14
PFIP upper hexapod 15 15 X
PFIP Rho stage 16 X X 16
Name # 1 3 7 8 14 2 4 11 15 16 9 10 13 5 6 12
Lower X-axis bearing trolley 1 1
Upper X-axis bearing trolley 3 3
Y-axis bearing trolley (Left) 7 7
Y-axis bearing trolley (Right) 8 8
PFIP support structure 14 14
Lower X-axis screw drive 2 X 2
Upper X-axis screw drive 4 X 4
Upper Hexapod frame 11 X 11
PFIP upper hexapod 15 15 X
PFIP Rho stage 16 X X 16
Lower hexapod frame 9 X X 9 X
Hexapod struts 10 X X 10
WFC strongback 13 X 13
Tracker bridge 5 X X X 5 X
Y-axis screw drive 6 X X 6
Wide Field Corrector (WFC) 12 X X X 12
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Table A1: Minimum, maximum, and most-likely duration estimate for each task, and 
associated learning curve (percentage of initial duration required to 
complete every rework iteration thereafter). 





    
Curve 
Sequence Activity Name Min Likely Max (0 to 1) 
1 Lower X-axis bearing trolley 10 15 20 0.1 
2 Lower X-axis screw drive 20 30 40 0.3 
3 Upper X-axis bearing trolley 15 15 20 0.1 
4 Upper X-axis screw drive 20 30 40 0.3 
5 Tracker bridge 60 65 80 0.3 
6 Y-axis screw drive 30 45 60 0.6 
7 Y-axis bearing trolley (Left) 10 15 20 0.1 
8 Y-axis bearing trolley (Right) 10 15 20 0.1 
9 Lower hexapod frame 10 15 20 0.4 
10 Hexapod struts 5 10 20 0.1 
11 Upper Hexapod frame 10 15 20 0.1 
12 Wide Field Corrector (WFC) 70 80 90 0.5 
13 WFC Strongback 30 45 60 0.6 
14 PFIP support structure 10 20 30 0.1 
15 PFIP upper hexapod 10 15 20 0.2 
16 PFIP Rho stage 20 30 40 0.4 
 
The next input parameter is the probability of rework (Figure A5).  The probability of 
rework can be made dependent on the direction of information flow, e.g. a change to 





Figure A5: Percent probability of rework for each component.  Direction of information 
flow is a factor in choosing each value. 
The final simulation input is the impact of rework effort (Figure A6).  This is the extent 
of the redesign that would be required should another component with a shared 
dependency experience changes. 
 
 
Figure A6: Rework effort impact is the extent of redesign that would be required in the 
event of changes to a component with shared dependency. 
Probability of Rework 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Lower X-axis bearing trolley 1 1
Lower X-axis screw drive 2 0.1 2
Upper X-axis bearing trolley 3 3
Upper X-axis screw drive 4 0.1 4
Tracker bridge 5 0.1 0.1 5 0.3 0.1
Y-axis screw drive 6 0.4 6 0.5
Y-axis bearing trolley (Left) 7 7
Y-axis bearing trolley (Right) 8 8
Lower hexapod frame 9 0.3 0.3 9 0.8
Hexapod struts 10 0.7 10 0.7
Upper Hexapod frame 11 11 0.6
Wide Field Corrector (WFC) 12 0.4 0.3 12 0.7
WFC strongback 13 0.7 13
PFIP support structure 14 14
PFIP upper hexapod 15 15 0.6
PFIP Rho stage 16 0.7 0.4 16
Rework Effort Impact 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Lower X-axis bearing trolley 1 1
Lower X-axis screw drive 2 0.6 2
Upper X-axis bearing trolley 3 3
Upper X-axis screw drive 4 0.6 4
Tracker bridge 5 0.2 0.2 5 0.5 0.7
Y-axis screw drive 6 0.3 6 0.4
Y-axis bearing trolley (Left) 7 7
Y-axis bearing trolley (Right) 8 8
Lower hexapod frame 9 0.3 0.3 9 0.4
Hexapod struts 10 0.3 10 0.3
Upper Hexapod frame 11 11 0.6
Wide Field Corrector (WFC) 12 0.6 0.5 12 0.8
WFC strongback 13 0.5 13
PFIP support structure 14 14
PFIP upper hexapod 15 15 0.2
PFIP Rho stage 16 0.3 0.3 16
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The simulation output is a histogram representing a normal distribution of possible design 
effort cycle times. 
 
 
Figure A7: A frequency plot of the Monte-Carlo simulation output, representing a 
normal distribution of the estimated design project duration. 
The DSM analysis methods above represent only a few of the capabilities 
currently available.  There are Commercial DSM software packages which enhance these 
analysis capabilities, as well as build upon them to incorporate Multi-Domain-Mapping 
tools that span technical and social domains for additional benefits to design 






[1] Bahill, A., and Botta, R., 2008, “Fundamental Principles of Good System 
Design,” Engineering Management Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 4, pp. 9-17. 
[2] Booth, J., et al., 2006, “The Wide Field Upgrade for the Hobby-Eberly 
Telescope,” Proceedings of the 2006 SPIE Symposium on Ground-Based and 
Airborne Telescopes, Vol. 6267. 
[3] Conklin, J. 2005, Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked 
Problems. Wiley, New York. 
[4] Danilovic, M., and Sandkull, B., 2004, “The Use of Dependence Structure Matrix 
and Domain Mapping Matrix in Managing Uncertainty in Multiple Project 
Situations,” International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 23. pp. 193-203. 
[5] Denker, S., Steward, D., and Browning, T., 2001, “Planning Concurrency and 
Managing Iteration in Projects,” Project Management Journal, Vol. 32, Iss. 3, pp. 
31-38. 
[6] Duffy, A., Ed., 1998, The Design Productivity Debate. Springer, Berlin. 
[7] Frankenberger, E., Badke-Schaub, P., and Birkhofer, H., Eds., 1998, Designers: 
The Key to Successful Product Development. Springer, London. 
[8] HETDEX: Leading the Revolution. Available at 
<http://hetdex.org/hetdex/index.php> (2009/6/14). 
[9] “HETDEX Tracker and Fiber Management System Specification.” University of 
Texas Center for Electromechanics, Internal Doc. No. RF272, 2009. 
[10] Hill, G., et al., “VIRUS: A Massively-Replicated Integral Field Spectrograph for 
HET,” Proceedings of the 2006 SPIE Symposium on Ground-Based and Airborne 
Instrumentation for Astronomy, Vol. 6269. 
[11] Lindemann, U., 2009, The Design Structure Matrix. Available at 
<http://www.dsmweb.org> (2009/6/17). 
[12] Lindemann, U., Maurer, M., and Braun, T., 2009, Structural Complexity 
Management: An Approach for the Field of Product Design. Springer, Berlin. 
[13] Maheswari, J., and Varghese, K., 2005, “Project scheduling Using Dependency 
Structure Matrix,” International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 23, pp. 223-
230. 
[14] Mesihovic, S., Malmqvist, J., and Pikosz, P., 2004, “Product Data Management 
System-Based Support for Engineering Project Management,” Journal of 
Engineering Design, Vol. 15, Iss. 4, pp. 389-403. 
 54 
[15] Oakley, M., Ed., 1990, Design Management: A Handbook of Issues and Methods. 
Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford. 
[16] Reinertsen, D., 1997, Managing the Design Factory. The Free Press, New York. 
[17] Schrage, M., 1989, No More Teams! Mastering the Dynamics of Creative 
Collaboration. Doubleday, New York. 




Nicholas Taylor Mollison was born June 18, 1979 in Springdale, Arkansas to 
parents Richard A. Mollison and Cindy D. Mollison.  After receiving his high school 
diploma from the Episcopal School of Dallas, Texas in May 1998, Nicholas attended The 
University of Texas at Austin.  He received the degree of Bachelor of Science in 
Mechanical Engineering from the University of Texas in May 2003.  Nicholas was 
employed by CRC-Evans Automatic Welding, Inc. in Houston, Texas as a product 
development engineer from August 2003 to June 2005.  In July 2005, Nicholas returned 
to Austin, Texas where he was employed as a Research Engineer Associate at the 




Permanent address: 1203-B W. 39 ½ Street, Austin, Texas  78756 
This report was typed by the author. 
 
